The 'Your Rights at Work' Campaign: 2005-2007 by McManus, Sally
180 Cosmopolitan Civil Societies Journal, Vol.1, No.2, 2009 
The ‘Your Rights At Work’ Campaign: 2005-20071
 
 
 
Sally McManus  
 
I was a union branch secretary for the whole of the ‘Your Rights at Work’ campaign, 
from the dark days of 2004 and I still am now. I was involved in many of the debates 
that happened at the leadership level within the NSW union movement, and also as a 
union secretary implementing decisions with members and their communities.  
With any campaign it is important not to make generalisations and to say because this 
worked in the campaign, therefore it should be used as a template for other 
campaigns. That is a mistake the union movement sometimes makes and a mistake we 
all can make in our own struggles. The other danger is to look at campaigns in 
retrospect and to say it was a particular aspect that really won the day. Of course, 
afterwards, and especially when a campaign is successful, you have all sorts of people 
that might have an interest in arguing a certain aspect was the key reason it was 
successful. For instance media companies saying it was the television advertising that 
did it. Isolating one part in this way, and using it to explain the whole, is a mistake.   
I want to try and give you a broad perspective about what actually went on in the 
campaign, the decisions that the union movement took, what that involved, and draw 
from that some lessons.  In the end I want to say two key things: firstly that it was a 
tried and true campaigning model. It was not anything new, not anything shiny, not 
anything made up by some brilliant leaders, by this generation of trade union leaders 
or by union members in general. It wasn’t some model that we got from another 
movement, it was a strategy that all successful movements have used and really it 
would be known to all of you. Secondly, and in this context it’s important for us not 
to look for silver bullets. 
                                                 
1 This is an edited version of a keynote address given at the ‘Beyond the Neo-Con Men’ conference, 
2008. It is not a refereed paper. 
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New Tactics  
What was new though, and what was special, were some of the tactics used 
throughout the campaign. They were new for us, for the trade union movement, and 
they were special because they were unique in the circumstances. But in the end, they 
are really just tactics. In terms of the overall strategy, what we ended up implementing 
was the same model you have seen for a lot of successful campaigns.   
So what was special in the YRAW campaign?  The first thing was the level of unity 
amongst the trade union movement. We have the advantage of being one of only a 
few trade union movements in the world to have just one peak body. Many trade 
union movements are split between several peak bodies, split along religious or along 
political grounds, and that really hampers their ability to act as a united movement.  
And whilst there was unity, this did not happen through any Stalinist enforcement or 
the force of personality of any particular leader. There were vigorous internal debates 
at every key point during the campaign. In the early days, for instance, we debated 
whether to campaign at all. There were debates about the levy imposed on all unions, 
which was used for television advertising and various other things. There was a 
significant debate about whether we should have television advertising at all, and you 
can imagine many of us were saying why should we give our money to Kerry Packer? 
There were debates about whether mass mobilisation was the right way to go or not. 
And of course, all the way up until Election Day there was an internal dialectic within 
our movement about what was the right strategy or the right tactic at that particular 
time.   
The strength of our movement was that once we made a decision, we all stuck to it. 
Whether we were on one side of the debate or the other, once the decision was made, 
we were very disciplined about it. I think this particular strength was built on our 
history and we had some test runs during the Howard years. The MUA dispute, for 
example, was a test-run of building unity within our movement. I remember before 
that dispute right wing and left wing unions and activists didn’t speak to each other. 
The dispute, because it was so dramatic, then threw all of us together and a lot of 
those old tribal hatreds or misconceptions were broken down. That set the scene, 
enabling the unity that we had during the campaign.  
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The second thing that is special about the YRAW campaign is that it was highly co-
ordinated. It is a massive logistical exercise to run a campaign of its size over a three-
year period. Just getting information out, for it to be simple, and for it to go right 
down to workplaces, was a big exercise in itself and of course we had central 
messaging throughout the campaign. That level of co-ordination was essential in the 
campaign’s success.   
Thirdly, what was special was the resources that were mobilised throughout the 
campaign. Even though union membership has been falling, we are still easily the 
largest social movement in the country and there are a lot of resources that we can 
bring to bear when we are co-ordinated and unified. Within my union, for instance, 
we levied our members a dollar a week for the length of the campaign. The levy went 
to the Australian Council of Trade Unions (ACTU) and raised millions of dollars that 
was then spent on TV ads, campaigning material, setting up the infrastructure, setting 
up the information centres, hiring venues, all the things you need to run a campaign 
on the scale we needed to. Also, in terms of resources, we had something important 
that our opponents didn’t have. And of course that was the people who we could 
mobilise.   
The final thing that I thought was special about this campaign, although it may not be 
very special in terms of campaigns in general, was a mixture of both top-down and 
bottom-up campaigning. I think that we really needed both.  
Campaign Techniques  
So what was new or unique in the YRAW campaign? We had union meetings at key 
points throughout the campaign, and these were not just in the capital cities and were 
not only within unions. Many of you were probably at campaign meetings that used a 
Sky Channel satellite broadcast. This idea of a simultaneous public broadcast to 
meetings across the country really came out of the NSW Teachers’ Federation, and 
the way they organised. These meetings were key in terms of getting a consistent 
message out, and building a sense of solidarity beyond the big cities, and beyond the 
union movement.  
For us to spend a lot of money on mass media was a big decision, as I mentioned 
before. Those of us who were critical in the beginning had renounced our criticism 
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probably by mid-2006. The media experts said that the very first advertisement, the 
one that we call the ‘Tracy’ ad, of the woman who’s been sacked with the two kids, 
was very powerful. In a way it became the defining image for us, right through the 
two years, and it became very hard for the Federal Government, for business with all 
their money and all their resources, to be able to compete with us on that level. Also 
we had consistent branding throughout the campaign. To have a single slogan and 
recognisable campaign materials across the country, and consistently throughout the 
campaign timeline, was a new thing.   
Another new aspect to the campaign was that we relied on focus groups and on a 
media company in terms of us shaping our message. We had a lot of arguments about 
this because of course union secretaries think they know exactly what people think 
and what their members think. The idea that we should get someone else to go and tell 
us was an affront to many people. But many of us realised that we needed to be a bit 
more sophisticated. That’s not to say that you just take whatever the media people 
say, but it’s useful information that can then inform your decisions.  
At those early focus groups, before Work Choices came out, they’d asked people a 
questions that states ‘if the government was going to bring in laws to abolish unfair 
dismissal, to destroy awards, what would you say about it’? And we, as paid trade 
union officials, were surprised that people were saying this is outrageous and that they 
were really angry. They said, ‘well, yes, it’s about rights, my rights have been taken 
off me and they’re worth fighting for’. I don’t think we would have got the bit about 
‘worth fighting for’ back in 2005 as part of our slogan and part of our attitude towards 
the campaign if it hadn’t been for the focus groups.   
Online campaigning, the YRAW website, the online forums and email groups also 
worked very well for those who are at their computers every day and that was a new 
thing for us. We raised a lot of money through online fundraising, to get billboards up, 
to keep TV ads running, and just through direct online appeals. This is an approach 
we adopted from the Dean campaign in the United States and from Get Up!,  
Issues at Stake  
The issue, obviously being the Work Choices laws, was everything. We really saw it 
as do or die. Work Choices was aimed at destroying the trade union movement and at 
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destroying for the rights of working families. For us, that was a huge motivating force 
and the issue in itself. Not every campaign has that, not every campaign has an issue 
that’s felt so strongly and so widely, that it is able to unite people across the whole of 
the country and across a whole class.  
I don’t know if we would’ve been able to build consensus, and mobilise all of those 
resources and effort, if it wasn’t for the seriousness of the issue. It was the big 
motivating factor, and what I’m really saying about that is that you can’t just make 
these campaigns happen. People have got to feel strongly enough around the issue in 
order to cross the political boundaries, to take the risks, and do a lot of the things we 
ended up doing in the YRAW campaign.  
Defining the issue is obviously important in any campaign and for us, something that 
was also a bit new was the use of a rights-based campaign frame. We had to translate 
lots of technical changes that the government was making, 726 pages of legislation, 
into five clear messages. Meaning, that Work Choices was going to take away unfair 
dismissal, it was going abolish awards, it was going to take away the independent 
umpire. We had to distil it into that, and ensure they were really clearly understood 
issues. We had to say them over and over again for three years.  
As I said before, understanding our audience was important and advice from outside 
was important in informing our decisions. The whole slogan about working families 
didn’t come from Obama, and it didn’t come from the Labor Party, it came from the 
trade union movement in Australia. We started talking in terms of working families 
back in 2005 because we knew from our research that that’s who we had to pitch our 
message to. We were quite cut-throat in saying well, we basically have to win back all 
those people who voted for Howard in 1996. So we found out who they were, we 
knew what their demographics were, and we asked them about how they identified 
themselves. What we found is they identified themselves as working families, so 
that’s where that aspect of the campaign came from.  
The other important thing about defining the issue and campaigning around the issue, 
was making it real. Work Choices, in terms of the actual legislation, didn’t actually 
affect the majority of people for some time. Of course it did in the sense of the general 
environment it created for bosses, but there were relatively few people on AWAs and 
Cosmopolitan Civil Societies Journal, Vol.1, No.2, 2009 185 
most Awards were only scheduled to be abolished half way through 2008. In lots of 
ways the worst aspects of Work Choices would only start kicking-in after the 2007 
federal election. So, making it real in terms of showing the real-life examples of what 
we were talking about was critical, and that was to do with the rights framework. It 
was about government taking away your rights, rights you already had, and they were 
taking it off you. Now, it doesn’t matter if you are a union member or not, no one 
likes to have their rights taken off them.  
A Three-Year Campaign  
By about June 2005 we had a really clear strategy. It was quite simple in some 
ways. First, during 2005 we had to concentrate on educating members. Then, in 2006, 
when Work Choices was being implemented, we had to defend people against it while 
continuing that education. In 2007 we had to win the election. In that period, at every 
union meeting I would go to I would explain to members about what the strategy was 
and discuss its elements. Then people could see where they fitted and why attending a 
day of action was important, or why building-up union density in their workplaces 
was important to defend against what your employer might try to do. And why we 
were spending money on TV ads, or why we were doing certain things was seen 
within the framework of a clear strategy that people could believe in.   
In 2005 I went up to the Northern Rivers region of NSW to start talking to community 
workers about what was not even announced yet in terms of what the government was 
planning. We knew what was coming because Howard had given a speech to the 
Business Council of Australia where he announced they were going to take away 
unfair dismissal laws, and abolish awards. Talking to community workers about the 
effect that was going to have on them, and why we needed to campaign against it, was 
really hard. No one believed us and people thought it just couldn’t be possible. It was 
like ploughing the ground in a drought, like a drought of 10 years, but over time it 
was getting traction. I look back now and think about those hundreds of meetings that 
union activists did, union organisers did, that delegates had done over those early 
stages, of educating people, and it was worth every single minute. Throughout the 
campaign, the more people knew about the changes the more they hated them 
(surprise, surprise) so that was crucially important.   
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Mass mobilisations were also very important in my view. They provided a real 
interim goal to organise around for union activists, a tangible thing that people could 
do in terms of showing opposition, and it gave activists a clear role in their 
workplaces or in their communities in terms of mobilising people. It built the sense of 
solidarity that we are in this together as a movement. That is something that you can’t 
put a price on. Also it builds hope, because through that solidarity and seeing that 
there are all these other people who are mobilised on the issue, it creates a feeling that 
we can really change things. And it also really developed the activists that became the 
local ‘Your Rights at Work’ groups.  
2006 was a really hard year. It was very much a defensive year because Work Choices 
was in and we had to stop as many bosses as possible implementing it. We had that 
sense that if we could keep the bosses at bay they wouldn’t be able to do enough 
damage to make it undoable. We all knew about the New Zealand experience and that 
almost overnight the tide had swept over the trade union movement, and that ground 
lost in terms of wages and conditions was hard to win back. So we had to create such 
a smell around Work Choices so that bosses would be afraid to implement the laws, 
and this meant we had to rally around any workers who had it imposed on them.  
We were looking for an iconic dispute, and we were expecting there would be 
something like Patricks with the MUA dispute, where a big employer would 
announce ‘we’re introducing AWAs and we’re going to sack our workforce’. What 
did we get instead? We got relatively small employers like the Cowra Meatworks and 
Spotlight. By targeting these employers we educated of our members, and scared 
other employers. They thought, ‘Well, I’ve got to add up the risks now, of starting to 
implement this. It may attract a national campaign and it may attract action in our 
communities. Maybe we don’t want to be the first to do this, lets let some other 
people do it first.’ So that helped as well. Then of course what we did when the laws 
affected real workers, we publicised it in a big way on the TV and in every meeting 
and in every possible way that we could. Soon we had muddied the Work Choices 
brand, and employers were afraid to be seen to be embracing it.    
2007 was our big year. We knew we were going to have a chance to get rid of the 
government, and start getting rid of Work Choices. We had to continue the same 
things we were doing the other two years. We still had to defend workers, but the 
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closer it got to the election the less employers wanted to touch Work Choices. Of 
course you had some employers introducing AWAs, but you didn’t have it in a 
wholesale way. So in a way the heavy lifting was already done, in my view, in the 
campaign in 2005, and the first half of 2006. Both those two years made 2007 
possible.   
Grassroots Mobilisation  
I wanted to talk a little bit about the bottom-up aspects of the campaign, as sometimes 
they get lost. Most of the work in this campaign was done by grassroots activists in 
workplaces and in their communities talking to people and organising around the 
issue. Most of the hard work was done at the workplace level, building union 
membership in workplaces, demanding that employers not implement Work Choices. 
There would have been thousands of union members that were doing that in their own 
workplaces. And the decisions about how they were going to organise were made by 
the workers themselves. 
The ‘Your Rights at Work’ groups are a good example of this bottom-up organising. 
The first ‘Your Rights at Work’ group, as far as I know, was set up in Lismore in 
2005 at the first day-of-action. Really what happened was that a whole lot of people 
came together in the community, union delegates and union members from a whole 
range of workplaces. They sat there, I think it was in the Lismore Worker’s Club, and 
watched the Sky Channel campaign broadcast. At the end of the meeting a few of the 
more experienced activists said ‘well let’s get everyone’s names’.  All these people 
had lived and worked together in a small town, and were also union members, but 
didn’t know they had that in common.  They may have worked in the nursery down 
the road, or they might have been a teacher, or they might have been a community 
worker. Normally if they walked down the street, they wouldn’t have much in 
common, but this brought them together. A group of activists taking some leadership 
said ‘well, look, why don’t we meet, every few weeks, and start looking at what we 
can do in our town around this’. So that’s where it started and they called themselves 
the Northern Rivers Unionists Network, and that was long before they were being 
called ‘Your Rights at Work’ groups.   
All-of-a-sudden there was a lot of activity in Lismore. For the next day-of-action they 
organised towards it, they leafleted the place, they went and spoke at various 
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workplaces, they put in a lot of work, and on the 1st July 2005 thousands of people 
came. They had a very large turnout for a small place, and people started saying, 
‘what’s going on in Lismore?’ Well really what had gone on was organising at a grass 
roots level amongst union activists. Other unions started to think about this, and there 
were other towns where groups were set up. I think quite often it was Teachers’ 
Federation activists taking it on, because they were the more experienced union 
activists in some of the smaller towns. These all had started organically, doing a 
similar thing in their regions.  
So a decision was made to support these groups, and Unions NSW started building 
membership lists, but it was only later that central resources or any central organising 
was put in place for what came to be called ‘Your Rights at Work’ groups.  From the 
beginning these groups were obviously cross-union, they were pretty much rank and 
file. It was only in 2007 that there was any full-time presence at all in terms of union 
officials in most of these places. They had limited formal structures and didn’t have 
position holders, anything like that. So the decisions they made then about how they 
were going to campaign were completely controlled by those activists in those towns 
and suburbs. The fantastic thing was that this produced very effective campaigns, 
because the decisions they made were based on their local circumstances.  
For example in the Blue Mountains there’s this thing called the Winter Magic 
Festival, which is unique to the Mountains. The local ‘Your Rights at Work’ group 
decided that they were going to organise a contingent in it and they all dressed up, I 
don’t know as magicians and similar, and that went down very well in that particular 
community. If you tried to do that in Penrith, or if you tried to do that in Newtown, 
everyone would think you were an idiot. If you had some centralised ‘you must do it 
this way’ model, it just would not have worked. The same in Lismore, they 
approached things much more around local markets and things that would already be 
happening around the place. Groups launched letter-writing campaigns to the local 
media, they signed-up people to campaign against the local member, and launched 
actions to defend local workers affected by Work Choices. In other places, like in 
Queanbeyan, the Empower group there approached things in a different way because 
they knew their area and they could campaign well within it. In Lindsay they 
approached things in a different way again. This was a particularly beautiful thing 
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about the campaign, the way that local union members controlled and innovated 
within the centralised messaging, using the top-down frames in a very, very effective 
way.    
In 2007, as the year went on, we got more and more focussed on marginal seats. We 
were convinced that we knew which sixteen seats had to change in order to bring 
down the government. We knew that we had to put everything we possibly could into 
winning those particular seats. So we did something new: pretty much all unions 
phoned all of our members in marginal seats. We called them three times during 2007. 
We spent a lot of time building relationships with people we identified as undecided 
voters, visiting them in their houses, talking to them about the importance of their 
vote and the importance of changing the government. That was something very new 
for us and it was something that took a lot of resources. Empirically it probably didn’t 
matter in the end, and although that part of the campaign did add to the swing, in my 
view I think we’d won it by mid-2006 and those people had already changed their 
minds. The heavy lifting we did in those two years had really already shifted it. But if 
I had the time over again I’d still do exactly the same things, because you can’t leave 
anything to chance.  
There were ‘Your Rights at Work’ full-time co-ordinators paid collectively by the 
union movement in those sixteen marginal seats across the county. They worked for a 
year, living and working in the electorate, resourcing the local ‘Your Rights at Work’ 
group. The groups became very successful in these areas because they had the full-
time resources. Then on Election Day, it was a big debate within the union movement, 
we decided to independently staff and resource all of the booths in seven marginal 
seats located in NSW. Every single one of those booths was staffed. The ALP 
couldn’t staff all their booths, but they didn’t want anything to do with us for the first 
four weeks of the six-week election campaign. I was saying to my organisers, ‘don’t 
worry, they’ll come begging’, and they did, about a week or two before the elections, 
when they realised they didn’t have the resources to staff the booths.  
So, for example, in places like Grafton where every single booth last election was 
won by the National Party, was packed with ‘Your Rights at Work’ people and 
completely covered with ‘Your Rights at Work’ material. National Party people 
turned up at six o’clock and said ‘What’s going on, that’s our area, and that’s the 
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Labor Party’s area. We’ve had an arrangement here for the last 50 years you 
know.’ Well, that arrangement was gone, and we were able to dominate things.   
In the end it probably didn’t matter because people had made up their mind by 
Election Day. It was more a demonstration of the depth of commitment and extent of 
the mobilisation. You had people that had never done a basic thing like hand-out on 
election day. If you look at the numbers of people that were involved, just ordinary 
working people who would never have done that it was enormous.    
So, to go back to what I said in the beginning, old campaigning is new campaigning. 
The activists of a generation before us learnt the same lessons that we learnt. There 
were new things for us though. We did take-on a new form of political campaigning 
in the marginal seats. What used to happen at election time in the trade union 
movement is that a month before the election some of us would give money, some of 
us would drag a few people out, maybe some of your most active members and your 
paid staff, and you’d hand-out at a polling booth and that would be it. So the 2007 
election was quite different.  
The other, final thing to emphasise is that the bottom-up elements of the campaign 
were essential. It shouldn’t now be seen as just a media campaign, because it wasn’t. 
Most of the hard work of the campaign was carried out by workers themselves in their 
communities, and the most innovative strategies and tactics and energy that went into 
the campaign also came from there. 
Finally I want to finish with this, which I love, a picture of the ‘Your Rights at Work’ 
march at the Grafton Jacaranda Festival. All those people that you see are rank and 
file people from various unions. They each made up a placard about what type of 
work they did - ‘I’m a timber worker, I’m a community worker, I’m a hospital 
worker’, all the way through the march. For them this was a really big step to go and 
march in a community festival, because it’s a very conservative place, Grafton, with 
very little activist or union history. There was a big internal debate amongst those 
activists, and they decided they weren’t going to carry their individual union flags or 
anything like that; they were going to identify the jobs that they did in the community. 
And they got a fantastic reception, and they’ll probably do it again. 
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